Looking for a success in the euro crisisadjustment programs: the case of Portugal by Reis, Ricardo
Looking for a success in the euro crisis 
adjustment programs: the case of Portugal1
Ricardo Reis 
Columbia University and LSE
November 2015
Abstract
Portugal’s adjustment program in 2010-14 under the troika was extensive and aimed at 
addressing its large debt and anemic growth, so it may serve as a blueprint for reforms in the 
Eurozone. This paper argues that, conditional on a diagnosis of the underlying problems of the 
Portuguese economy, the adjustment program failed to deliver in definitely addressing the 
problems in public finances, but succeeded in leaving promising signs of reform in the structure 
of the economy. In particular, on the negative side, public debt is still high, primary surpluses 
improved modestly, and public spending barely fell as the problem of ever-rising pension 
payments remained unsolved. On the positive side, unemployment fell sharply, exports and the 
current account balance rose, capital and labor reallocated to more productive and tradable 
sectors, and the country is growing faster than the EU for the first time in 15 years. 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1. Introduction
From the start, the euro crisis posed a unique challenge to crisis management. In many 
ways, the events of 2010-11 in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain resembled a classic sudden 
stop. But, to deal with the ensuing recession, there was no currency to devalue, no independent 
central bank to back up and resolve struggling national banks, few private bondholders to 
arrange for a debt write-down, and large and legally protected welfare states that are hard to 
reform. There were also no European institutions set up to deal with a crisis of this type and 
magnitude. As a result, the adjustment programs for these four countries were partly 
improvised, unique in their features, and their effectiveness was in question from the start.
Still, if the euro survives, there will surely be new crises in the future. In turn, as other 
regions in the world choose different forms of economic integration, they would like to learn 
what mistakes to avoid in following the European example. Inspecting the adjustment programs 
in place during the past few years is in order.
Looking for a failure is easy: no matter where the blame lays, it is undeniable that the 
Greek adjustment program has failed, with grim consequences for its population. In turn, Ireland 
had started many of the reforms to its banking sector and public finances before its adjustment 
program began, and there were few macroeconomic measures in the program. Spain received 
financial assistance to recapitalize its banks with conditions on implementing reforms in the 
financial sector, but there was no full-fledged IMF macroeconomic adjustment program. 
This leaves Portugal as a potential example of success to counterbalance the failure in 
Greece. Portugal is a good case to focus on for many reasons. Its adjustment program is 
already complete, and it consisted of an exhaustive list of reforms that were almost all 
implemented. Coming after Greece and Ireland, the program benefitted from the accumulation 
of some experience. Finally, while all countries have their idiosyncrasies, Portugal’s crisis did 
not involve a house price boom, nor extreme fiscal profligacy, but was mostly due to inexistent 
productivity and economic growth since 2000. Reversing this slump might offer lessons on how 
to raise the disappointing prospects for economic growth in the Euro-area as a whole.
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There are two public views on the success of the adjustment program. One is captured 
by the statement of the influential German finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble in June of 2014, 
commenting on Portugal’s announcement of the end of its program with the IMF: “Portugal’s 
reform efforts have paid off. Today’s decision by the government in Lisbon is proof of this. 
Portugal no longer needs European assistance and can stand on its own two feet again. This is 
a major success. Capital market confidence has returned, and rightly so.” (German Federal 
Ministry of Finance, 2014). From a narrow perspective of success, defined as being able to 
resume sovereign borrowing, Portugal delivered. By the end of the program, the Portuguese 
state was able to borrow again and at moderate 10-year interest rates, both at the end of the 
program (3.5%) and thereafter, with interest rates not exceeding 3% in 2015 so far, in spite of 
the Greek crisis.  Equally important, the troika extended the maturity of the Portuguese official 2
debt and reduced interest payments, and the Portuguese debt office successfully extended the 
maturity of the outstanding debt, with 10-year issuances throughout 2014 and 2015. As a result, 
the average maturity of the debt increased from 6 years in 2010 to above 8 years at the start of 
2015, reducing rollover risk (Reis, 2015). Another debt crisis is unlikely in the near future.
A different view was expressed one year later by Paul Krugman in an article that 
included Portugal in “Europe’s Many Economic Disasters” where he stated: “Portugal has also 
obediently implemented harsh austerity — and is 6 percent poorer than it used to 
be.” (Krugman, 2015). From the perspective of macroeconomic performance, the program 
seems to be a failure, with real GDP per capita 4.9% lower in 2014 than it was in 2010, and total 
employment falling from 4.9 million to 4.5 million. If success is judged as a rebound of the 
economy from its prolonged depression, then there is little to celebrate.
There is a simple way to reconcile these two opposing views. The first view focuses on 
public finances, where the program would have delivered, while the second view argues that its 
consequences were a macroeconomic disaster. Both views could then be right, with a success 
in stabilizing public finances but little gains in getting the economy out of its slump. 
This article argues that, in fact, both views are more likely wrong, and the verdict on the 
adjustment program is the opposite: there are promising changes in the structure of the 
 The sources for the data mentioned in the text are varied and describe dina an accompanying 2
replication file.
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economy, but public finances remain far from a path that lowers the public debt. It is hard to 
judge the success of a program without knowing what are the criteria and what is the 
counterfactual. My approach is to look at the progress in solving Portugal’s underlying structural 
problems and in addressing the four key challenges that Portugal faced at the height of the 
crisis: paying for large past debts, controlling future public spending, re-starting economic 
growth and lowering unemployment, and improving competitiveness and capital allocation. 
Section 2 starts by providing a diagnosis of Portugal’s slump and crash, so that sections 3 to 6 
then assess success conditionally on the economy’s diseases to determine whether the 
program helped to heal them.  Another approach would have been to compare the adjustment 3
program to what would have been ideal, if the best policies had been followed. While there have 
definitely been many mistakes, I leave for others the job of highlighting them and arguing 
whether they are only clear now with the benefit of hindsight.
2. Diagnosis of the crisis
Portugal requested international help in April of 2011, and officially agreed to terms one 
month later. This came after a run up in 10-year interest rates on government bonds, which 
reached 9.6% in May, up from 5.0% one year earlier. The government had difficulty rolling over 
bonds that were coming due, and signed a 3-year agreement with the troika to secure financing 
of up to €78 billion, which expired on June 30, 2014.
The Euro-crisis arose as large capital flows from the core to the periphery of Europe, 
which had built up since the introduction of the euro, suddenly reversed in 2009-10. Without a 
currency to depreciate between different regions of the Euro-zone, the large and sudden 
contraction in the current account deficit required a large contraction in domestic consumption 
and investment, driving these economies into recession. A fall in the real exchange rate was 
required, but the usual rigidities that slow the adjustment of prices and wages led to a large and 
prolonged increase in unemployment. This is the traditional side of the crisis (Shambaugh, 2012 
and Blanchard, 2013). 
 The European Commission (2014) and Jorge (2014) provide alternative evaluations, more favorable and 3
more critical, respectively.
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New to this sudden stop, the capital flows across borders were intermediated by banks, 
and largely funded through the interbank market (Brunnermeier and Reis, 2015). In the 
European periphery, banks and capital markets lacked the depth to allocate the large inflows 
that came with financial integration, likely misallocating them into unproductive non-tradable 
sectors. A flight to safety in response to higher risk aversion following the 2008 financial crisis 
had a cross-border dimension in Europe. The sudden stop came with fire sales in financial 
markets and falls in bank capital that led to large contractions in domestic credit.
Another novel and unique feature to the euro crisis is what has been labeled the 
“diabolic loop” or the “doom loop” between banks and sovereigns (Brunnermeier et al, 2011, and 
Obstfeld 2013). European banks held large amount of sovereign bonds. As economic activity 
slowed and public deficits rose, fears about sovereign default led to falls in the prices of 
government bonds, large losses in banks’ holdings, and further fire sales and contractions in 
credit, deepening the recession. Once the crisis was in motion, the diabolic loop worsened 
because banks would offset the sudden stop of private capital by pledging government bonds 
as collateral at the ECB to obtain public financing. Together with the official troika bailout 
programs, this implied that within a couple of years, most of the public debt of the countries in 
crisis was held by either official creditors or domestic banks.4
As a result of these features, the Portuguese crisis combined a deep recession and a 
debt crisis, as in other crisis countries. What was then special about the Portuguese crisis?  To 5
start, Portugal’s recession did not begin with a crash in 2010, but rather with a slump that had 
been going on for ten years before that. In the 2000-09 period, real GDP per capita grew by only 
2.9% and the unemployment rate rose from 4.9% to 11.3%. The extent of the economic calamity 
in Greece during the crisis has been often emphasized: Greek real GDP grew cumulatively by 
only 1.4% in between 2000 and 2012. But Portugal grew by the same 1.4% during the same 
period, because it was already slumping in the first ten years of the century. Related, Portugal 
did not have a house price boom, nor a significant expansion of the construction sector before 
the crisis. The large expansion in nontradables and consequent appreciation of the real 
exchange rate that came with the large capital inflows from the rest of Europe happened instead 
 Crosignani et al (2015) document the increase in banks’ holdings of Portuguese debt.4
 See Fagan and Gaspar (2007), Bento (2010), Reis (2013) and Alexandre et al (2014).5
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in the wholesale and retail sector and community services (education, health care and social 
work).
The debt crisis also had two distinct features relative to the other crisis countries. First, 
there is little evidence of public profligacy in Portugal before 2007. All of the increase in public 
spending is accounted for by increases in the payment of old-age pensions and unemployment 
benefits, and both of these systems actually became less generous during this period (Reis, 
2013). Moreover, taxes increased. Second, partly because of the contraction in income after 
2000 without as large a contraction in consumption, private external debt was higher in Portugal 
than in the other euro-crisis countries: net international liabilities were already 104% of GDP by 
the end of 2010. 
Combining these common features to the euro crisis and Portugal’s specific 
characteristics, the challenge of the adjustment program was to deal with four problems: How to 
pay for the accumulated debt, public and private? How to control public spending, especially in 
pensions? How to leave the slump and restart growth? And how to restore competitiveness by 
improving the allocation of resources in the economy? The next four sections assess the 
program through these four lenses. Politics is left out of the discussion until the conclusion 
because of a final Portuguese distinction in its economic and debt crisis: there was a relative 
political consensus around the adjustment programs. They were signed by the three major 
center parties, and their share of the votes on polls fell slightly during the program, without great 
gains to new or radical parties, unlike what happened in Greece and Spain.
3. Paying past debts
At the start of the program, Portugal had both large public debt and large external debt. 
With difficulties in rolling over either of the two felt by private and public sectors alike, and with 
debt overhang holding back new investment, adjustment required dealing with this debt.
Starting with paying for the national debt, the trade balance went from -7.6% to 0.5% of 
GDP.  The country had not had a trade surplus since World War II, so this is no small 6
 All comparisons are between 2010 and 2014, using annual data, unless stated otherwise.6
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accomplishment. At the same time, if this had been achieved through a contraction in imports, 
both because of a contraction in aggregate demand during the crisis as well as because of the 
reduced price of oil, one might worry that this improvement was temporary. An argument against 
this is that the ratio of exports to GDP increased from 29.9% to 39.9%, and Portugal improved 
its share in most of its export markets.
Turning attention to the public debt, the budget deficit improved from -11.2% of GDP to 
-7.2%, but part of this was due to the reduction in interest payments when privately-held debt 
was rolled over into troika debt. Still, the primary surplus also improved markedly from -8.2% to 
-2.3% of GDP. Much ink has been spilled on the virtues and pitfalls of austerity in a debt crisis. 
One interesting feature on the Portuguese situation (and the euro crisis) is represented in Table 
1. Aside from the primary surplus since 2010, it also shows its projected path according to 
different waves of IMF programs, as well as the fall in the deficit between 2005 and 2008, when 
Portugal was in violation of the Maastricht limits and had to bring its deficit in line. The pace of 
austerity was milder than what was planned, with constantly relaxed targets, and similar in 
2011-14 to 2005-08. It is hard to make a case for unexpected austerity from the the start of 2012 
onwards, or to see a dramatic reform in Portuguese public finances. Another jarring comparison 
comes with the United States. Between 2010 and 2014, the U.S. federal surplus improved by 
5.9%, in spite of little talk of excess austerity and no troika impositions; Portugal’s improved by 
only 4.0%.
Table 1. Public primary deficits: actual, IMF program forecasts, and prior to crisis 
Source: IMF reports on Portugal.
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Year Actual
Forecasts
Year Actual
June 2011 October 2012
January 
2013
2010 -8.2
2011 -3.1 -1.7 2005 -3.6
2012 -0.8 0.3 2006 -1.6
2013 0.0 2.1 0.2 -0.2 2007 -0.1
2014 2.3 2.8 2.4 2.1 2008 -0.7
Lowering the debt can also be done by selling assets or by restructuring liabilities. As a 
sign of the first, Portugal’s gross external debt grew by only €0.5bn and the net international 
investment position worsened by only €8.3bn. Large companies, both public and privately-
owned, were sold to foreigners, including the major electrical utility, the larger 
telecommunications company, the airline, and large banks. 
As for the second, in spite of the cut in the public deficit, the stock of public debt went 
from 96% to 130% of GDP. This number may be misleading, because it refers to the face value 
of the debt. Yet, in 2012, the troika restructured the Portuguese debt (together with that of 
Greece and Ireland) extending maturities and lowering interest payments, therefore reducing its 
market value in spite of no cuts to the face value. Since a large share of the debt is owed to the 
troika institutions, and is not traded, there is no market value to assess it. Following Dias et al 
(2014) and Schumacher and di Mauro (2015), I calculate the present value of the payments that 
the Portuguese government has committed to make to all of the holders of its debt, both private 
and public. If, following these authors, one uses a subjective interest rate of 5% per year to 
discount the payments, then the market value of the debt is four-fifths of its face value. Using 
instead market discount rates for the yield curve on Portuguese debt, the market value is 95% 
of the face value.
Either way, Portugal still has a high public debt outstanding and a meager primary 
surplus. It is difficult to see how Portugal can get public debt under control without a new 
reconfiguration of maturities and interest payments on the troika debt that more significantly 
reduces the market value of the public debt. The radicalization of European public opinion 
caused by the 2015 Greek crisis has made this harder to achieve.
4. Public spending under control? Little progress
A large part of the reduction in the public deficit was achieved via increases in the tax 
rates on personal income and sales, as well as tighter enforcement. Overall government 
revenue increased from 40.6% to 44.5% of GDP. At the same time, government consumption 
purchases fell from 20.7% to 18.5% of GDP, and the cut in public investment was even sharper, 
from 5.3% to 2.0%. 
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Yet, transfers increased from 22.1% to 23.2% of GDP, in spite of the fact that all of the 
increase in public spending between 2000 and 2007 was already entirely accounted for by 
increases in old-age pension payments. As a result, while total public spending fell from €93bn 
to €90bn, spending excluding public investment it actually rose from €84bn to €86bn. Once 
public investment returns to its pre-crisis levels, public spending will be almost unchanged 
mostly because of the increase in social transfers.
It is up for debate whether public spending should keep on increasing, accompanied by 
even higher taxes. It is more clear that given current trends, the pension system in Portugal will 
accumulate ever larger deficits and, absent reform, be responsible for any future fiscal crises. 
During the adjustment programs, the retirement age increased to 66 years, early retirement was 
suspended, and survivor pensions became means tested, but most reforms were either modest 
or generously grandfathered. The more meaningful impact on spending came from an across-
the-board cut in pensions. But these cuts were partly reversed by the constitutional court, and 
all the the political parties have promised to fully reverse them in the next two years. As a result, 
the permanent adjustment to public spending remains mostly to be done.
5. Structural reforms: growth and labor markets
Between 2000 and 2009, Portugal’s real GDP per capita grew 7.3% less than the EU 
average, excluding Germany. By the end of adjustment program, in 2014, Portugal grew 0.3% 
faster than the EU without Germany, and the IMF forecasts that it will continue doing so in the 
near future. Germany has been unusual in the EU since 2000, slumping in the beginning of the 
century and booming after 2010 when the rest of Europe was in crisis. Taking the EU without 
Germany as the appropriate comparison, growth seems to have resumed in Portugal, starting 
the process of catching up to the rest of Europe.
In this comparison, it is important to note that the economic outlook is still dismal. 
Growth forecasts from the IMF for the next 3 years are a modest average of 1.5% per year, 
reflecting the economic stagnation of the European Union. But, from the perspective of the 
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adjustment program, it is a good sign that Portugal has resumed convergence to the rest of 
Europe after diverging since the start of the century.
Moreover, unlike in other European labor markets, Portuguese unemployment has fallen 
quite rapidly so far. The seasonally adjusted unemployment rate at the end of 2014 was 13.6%, 
still above the value at the end of 2010 (12.2%), but it was down to 12.2% by September of 
2015 after falling almost monotonically from its peak of 17.5% in January of 2013.
Why this quick adjustment? One distinguishing feature of the Portuguese labor market is 
its dual nature (Centeno and Novo, 2012). On the one hand, many workers benefit from 
protected contracts that make layoffs expensive, contribute to low job creation and destruction, 
and encourage low labor productivity. On the other hand, as many as half of all workers are on 
term contracts and switch jobs often. These include the large majority of jobs created in this 
century and are mostly held by people younger than forty. This duality is a development problem 
since it lowers average productivity and makes reforms difficult. A large share of the population 
is unproductive and almost impossible to fire. Yet, at the margin, it implies that the Portuguese 
labor market is actually somewhat flexible in response to a macroeconomic shock. The marginal 
worker is in a term contract. Job creation and destruction are easy and the unemployment rate 
can adjust quickly to major shocks.7
This duality also suggests that to evaluate the adjustment in the labor market requires 
looking at the composition of employment. This will let us see whether churn in the labor market 
during the adjustment programs affected the average worker and average productivity in the 
economy. Total employment fell from 4867 to 4492 thousand workers but, looking across 
sectors, agriculture plus construction account for two thirds of this reduction. Looking by 
education level, employment of workers with a primary school education or less declined by 824 
thousand. That is, employment among those with secondary schooling or higher education 
actually increased during these four years of crisis, by 192 and 293 thousand, respectively.
 Some of the decline in unemployment was certainly also due to emigration: the population fell by 172 7
thousand, or 1.6%. This decline in population is steady since 2010 though, while unemployment rises and 
falls. A third driver of the fall in unemployment is decline in participation by discouraged long-term 
unemployed, but the careful statistical work to quantify how large this was remains to be done.
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Another sign of this compositional adjustment comes from the adjustment of labor 
compensation. Wages fell the most (8%) for those with higher education, while they only slightly 
fell (1%) for those with primary education or less. At the relevant margin of adjustment, wages 
adjusted flexibly, and employment rebounded. In aggregate, real unit labor costs fell by 6.6% 
during these four years, mostly due to a fall in real compensation (5.3%).
These numbers suggest structural changes in the Portuguese economy, and perhaps a 
reversal of the misallocation of resources that had plagued it in the past 15 years.
6. Competitiveness and the allocation of capital
In the World Economic Forum competitiveness index, Portugal improved from being 
ranked 46th to 36th between its 2010/11 report and its 2014/15 report. This was the result of 
many legal reforms that were part of the extensive adjustment programs. The IMF (2015b) 
documents 494 different structural reform actions, about half in the public sector, and half in 
deregulation of product, labor, and financial markets. Whether any of it leads to higher economic 
growth is an open question.
Competitiveness is often measured using a real exchange rate. Yet, the movements in 
the Portuguese effective real exchange rate were mostly due to changes in the value of the euro 
vis-a-vis other currencies. Most of the capital flows happened within EU borders, towards non 
tradable sectors in the periphery and to less productive and more protected industries (Reis, 
2013, and Dias et al, 2014). A more appropriate diagnosis of competitiveness than the real 
exchange rate is the relative price of nontradables. Between 2010 and 2014, it fell by only 2.4%, 
signaling little improvement.
At the same time, as noted already, exports and the tradable sector expanded 
considerably. The current account surplus went from -10.1% to 0.6% of GDP, suggesting a 
marked improvement in competitiveness. Much as in the years before the crisis, there was a 
significant reallocation across tradables and nontradables during the adjustment in spite of small 
changes in relative prices.
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Looking for signs of an improved allocation of resources, it would be desirable to have 
estimates of productivity and markups. Neither are available with current data. But, looking at 
the much more imperfect measure of labor productivity, output per hour increased by 2.8% in 
the overall economy. More interestingly, Reis (2013) emphasized that two sectors, retail and 
wholesale trade and real estate activities, had a large increase in markups and stagnant 
productivity in 2000-07 and yet absorbed large amounts of the capital inflow. These two sectors 
had among the largest increases in output per hour between 2010 and 2014, 11.1% in 
wholesale and retail trade, and 10.8% in real estate, even as they shrank in their relative size. 
This evolution is consistent with misallocation and inefficiency before the crisis, and with an 
improvement during the adjustment program.
As is typical in Europe, the financial system is dominated by banks, and they are crucial 
in allocating capital across sectors. Since 2010, the shareholders of most banks in Portugal lost 
almost all of their investment, after several waves of recapitalization, and with one of the four 
major banks going through resolution. Moreover, the banks were subject to the ECBs asset 
quality reviews as well as more intense regulation. The fall in total loans is more than fully 
accounted for by the decline in loans to the construction sector, and the ratio of credit to 
deposits increased.
There are reasons to be wary of the state of banks’ finances. First, nonperforming loans 
to non-financial corporations have increased almost continuously, from 4% to 14%. Rather than 
rising sharply at the start of the adjustment program, as banks and regulators revalued assets, 
this slow and prolonged acknowledgment of losses suggests that banks may have been rolling 
over bad loans. Second, and confirming this fear, corporate debt stayed almost unchanged at 
153% of GDP. By comparison, in Spain during the same period, it fell by more than 20% of GDP. 
The IMF (2015c) partly attributed this to the lack of legal reforms allowing for corporate 
bankruptcies and debt write downs.
7. Conclusions
It is difficult to call an adjustment process a success when the country in question has 
barely grown in 15 years and unemployment is 12.2%. Yet, the Portuguese economy has 
 12
changed in many directions that seem promising. The misallocation of resources that plagued it 
seems to have started to reverse, as export sectors have grown, employment shifted to more 
educated workers, protection of local interests declined, and output per hour increased in the 
least productive sectors. The economy is growing faster than in rest of Europe, and while the 
definitive tests of adjustment will be whether economic growth in the next few years is able to 
offset the stagnation of the last 15 years, there are encouraging signs of some success.
 At the same time, it is easy to claim success in adjusting public finances when looking at 
the profile of stable and small payments that the Portuguese state has to make in the near term. 
Yet, behind the low interest rates and longer maturities, public debt is 130% of GDP, austerity 
was far from being decisive on generating large primary surpluses, and public spending will 
keep on rising given the lack of a reform of the pension system. The evolution of public finances 
is closer to being a failure and, without a quiet restructuring of the debt to the European 
authorities over the next few year that lowers its market value, there are reasons to be worried.
In the near term, as the recent Greek crisis illustrates, it is often politics that derails 
adjustment. In this regard, in the last four years the troika had in Portugal a very committed and 
cooperative government. Yet, the troika insisted on changes in pensions that were repeatedly 
deemed unconstitutional, pushed for changes to the structure of payroll taxes that were very 
unpopular, and sent contradictory public messages on the need to adjust public finances. 
Starting from an initial position of support for reforms, the troika made itself unpopular, often 
unnecessarily. Even if there is no dramatic reversal of the reforms so far, there is uncertainty on 
whether what remains to be done will ever take place.
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